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Abstract
Recent advances in metagenomic technology and computational prediction may inadvertently weaken an
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Through cross-kingdom genetic and metagenomic forensics, we can
already predict at least a dozen human phenotypes with varying degrees of accuracy. There is also growing
potential to detect a “molecular echo” of an individual’s microbiome from cells deposited on public surfaces. At
present, host genetic data from somatic or germ cells provide more reliable information than microbiome samples.
However, the emerging ability to infer personal details from different microscopic biological materials left behind
on surfaces requires in-depth ethical and legal scrutiny. There is potential to identify and track individuals, along
with new, surreptitious means of genetic discrimination. This commentary underscores the need to update legal
and policy frameworks for genetic privacy with additional considerations for the information that could be acquired
from microbiome-derived data. The article also aims to stimulate ubiquitous discourse to ensure the protection of
genetic rights and liberties in the post-genomic era.
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Background
DNA sampling and sequencing are now routinely ap-
plied in several areas of research and practice. These in-
clude criminal investigations, research on public parks
and subways, and multidisciplinary genomics projects.
The collection of genomic and metagenomic profiles
across the world has led to a greater understanding of
the world’s genetic diversity. However, it also raises an
array of ethical and legal questions [1–4]. Indeed, priv-
acy expectations are reduced once personal materials are
in the public realm. A person’s genetic information (e.g.,
acquired from their hair, skin cells, or microbiome)
could conceivably be collected in a public setting. This
could have a considerable impact on privacy, and the
ability to genetically discriminate could be utilized for
nefarious means.
In the USA, the Genetic Information Non-discrimination
Act 2008 (GINA) made it illegal for companies with over
15 employees to use genetic discrimination for health insur-
ance and employment purposes [5]. However, a person and
their family’s genetic profiles can still be utilized to deny or
adjust life insurance, long-term care insurance, and disabil-
ity insurance [6]. Survey data show that 6 years after its
enactment, over 80% of US adults were unaware of GINA,
and 30% of those who were informed reported deep
concerns about genetic discrimination [5]. The National
Institute of Health’s “Precision Medicine Initiative” [7] and
genome-guided medical care also raise concerns regarding
privacy and safety. This is due to the risks of data sharing
when congenital haplotypes found in the data may be used
to discriminate against patients and their family members.
In addition, the depth of information gained from genetic
remnants on public surfaces has implications for individual
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rights to genetic privacy under GINA and the criminal just-
ice system.
In 2019, an investigation was launched into the supply
of 1500 DNA samples from the Crumlin children’s hos-
pital in Ireland to a DNA collection company without
authorization from the patients [8]. This may represent
a breach of the European Union’s general data protec-
tion regulation (GDPR) Article 9, which requires proper
consent for the processing of DNA data [9]. However,
many countries implement their own interpretation of
this regulation, thus leading to calls to develop a cross-
border code of conduct for genomic data sharing [10].
Importantly, explicit considerations for microbiome-
derived information are not part of the genetic privacy
narrative that informs this regulation. In March 2018, a
Parliamentary Joint Committee (PJC) inquiry into the
Australian life insurance industry recommended an im-
mediate ban on the use of predictive genetic test results
[11]. A recent study revealed illegal genetic discrimin-
ation by Australian life insurance companies, represent-
ing a broader concern [11].
In criminal law, the US legal system’s notion of privacy
under the Fourth Amendment is based on a person’s
reasonable expectation of privacy: “what a person know-
ingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection
[12].” The prevailing question is should humans, who
constantly shed their genetic (host and microbiome)
materials, have a reasonable expectation that these mate-
rials will not be collected from public surfaces? In other
words, should genetic material be treated differently
than fingerprints or material property? As we enter the
era of “ubiquitous sequencing [2],” people must now
assume that their DNA can be collected, sequenced,
annotated, and interpreted by other people, particularly
if retrievable from a public place. In that respect, another
important question is when a person leaves DNA or
RNA behind on a public surface, what personal informa-
tion could be revealed?
Main text
Molecular signatures in the post-genomic era
Technological advances in genomics have created the
potential for forensic methods beyond DNA, leading us
to a “post-genomic” forensic era with identifiable infor-
mation in the RNA and epigenetic states. Information
that can contribute to identifying human individuals
could potentially be found within the vast diversity of
microorganisms that are in, on, and around us, collect-
ively known as the microbiome [13, 14]. Next-
generation sequencing (NGS) has been used to localize
these organisms to a unique part of the human body,
forming a “molecular cartography” of an individual [15].
Beyond microorganisms, recent metagenomics studies
have enabled a cross-kingdom examination of life, in-
cluding urban genetic maps [16] in worldwide cities
[17]. The availability of these new datasets and methods
can enable inferences of at least a dozen phenotypes
across several categories. These include human DNA,
human RNA, epigenetics, epitranscriptome, and meta-
genomes (Fig. 1). Furthermore, the advent of “Big Data”
allows the intersection of these identifiers to provide
additional revelatory information.
In the following 12 sections, we summarize the pheno-
types that could be discerned from DNA or RNA depos-
ited on public surfaces, along with methods to acquire
this information. Some of the suggestions are still in
development, but given the ubiquity of genomic tools
and possibilities for advancements, it is still important to
highlight areas with potential.
Fig. 1 Cross-kingdom methods of forensics. Categories of multi-omic and multi-kingdom measurements can create both forensic (left table) and
social (right table) profiles for a person, based on their epigenome (pink), epitranscriptome (green), fingerprint (yellow), microbiome (orange), and
genome (blue). Categories for types of inferred information are detailed in each table by the trait/activity and the revelatory information
Elhaik et al. Microbiome           (2021) 9:114 Page 2 of 8
Identity
Criminal cases have been solved by comparing DNA
found at the crime scene with the DNA of individuals or
their families who have submitted their genomic data to
genealogy databases [18]. However, a supposedly “an-
onymous dataset” may also reveal a person’s identity
using the Y-chromosome’s short tandem repeats (STRs),
which can be linked to surnames [19, 20], or by querying
genealogy databases [21], which arguably is constitu-
tional under the Fourth Amendment [22]. The wide-
spread use of DNA profiling with Combined DNA Index
System (CODIS) markers for anyone who is arrested
allows law enforcement to use STR markers to find a
relative who committed a crime through “familial DNA
searches” [23]. Assuming a database of gut metagenomes
from individuals, variation in gut microbiota can con-
tribute towards genomic fingerprinting [24], which can
be crossed with consumer DNA that companies like
FamilyTreeDNA are sharing with the FBI [25]. Studies
have shown that the skin microbiome may exhibit a de-
gree of inter-individual variability and can be recovered
from objects such as computers even if left untouched
for 2 weeks [26]. The microbiome has also been linked
to a person’s phone and shoes [27]. Many of the studies
in the microbial forensics realm have moderate model
accuracies, and improvements are required before highly
accurate information can be elucidated. However, as
technology continues to improve, there is potential to
identify individuals through microbial profiles with a
much higher accuracy level in the near future.
Age
Each time a cell replicates, a chromosomal loss can
occur. Measuring these molecular alterations in the Y-
and X-chromosomes [28], telomeres [29], and DNA
methylation [29] allows the molecular age of the body to
be estimated. Applications of the latter method have
been reported to predict chronological age [29] closely.
The skin microbiome also has the potential to be a
predictor of age with high accuracy (mean ± standard
deviation, 3.8 ± 0.45 years of chronological age) [30];
however, the results vary by tissue, gender, and age. Fur-
ther studies are needed to demonstrate the applicability
of this approach.
Biological sex
This can be inferred through DNA, RNA, and epigenet-
ics [31]. The microbial communities of pubic hairs [32]
and the lower gastrointestinal tract [33] also differ
between the sexes. Moreover, Luongo et al. [34] studied
airborne microbial diversity in university dormitory
rooms (n = 91). Through relative abundance analysis,
machine learning techniques could predict the biological
sex of occupants with 79% accuracy [34]. As microbial
relative abundance data are a completely different form
of data to that of host DNA, it could contribute towards
gaining personal information in the absence of quality
host DNA samples.
Facial features
Several facial features, like hair color and texture/thick-
ness, eye color, and skin tone, can be genetically predicted
with varying levels of accuracy [23], and this is expected to
improve as genotypic and phenotypic databases continue
to increase.
Ancestry and biogeography
Differences between continental groups are observable
in different phenotypes, such as genomic sequences [35]
and the vaginal microbiome [36]. Genetic variation
between human populations is engraved in ancestry in-
formative markers (AIMs) [37], which can be used to
predict the geographic region of the DNA’s ancestral or-
igins with an accuracy of a few hundred kilometers [38]
or less [39, 40]. However, caution should be practiced
since biases may arise primarily due to the inaccuracy of
ancestry estimation tools and subpopulation undersam-
pling [41].
Geospatial localization
Various techniques are available to ascertain concurrent
localization information, including microbial DNA of
soil [42], microbial DNA of surfaces [14], pathogenic
viruses [43], and metagenomes [44]. To geo-localize a
sample, these approaches require global city-wide refer-
ence data, such as those collected by the MetaSUB con-
sortium for metagenomes [14]. Although studies that
aim to localize samples typically suffer from modest
sample sizes or prioritize classification over prediction,
there is undoubtedly potential to develop more rigorous
methods and improve the confidence of geospatial
inferences.
Zooculture
Metagenomes could provide valuable evidence regarding
interactions with pets and wildlife. This information could
conceivably be evidence of criminal behaviors such as
illegal fishing or poaching [45]. Additionally, the exchange
of microbial communities between a pet and the owner
can provide information on the length of their association
[46]. There are pathways to trace microbial profiles from
other non-human species to a given environment or pet
ownership. These ideas are theoretical at the moment, but
with methodological refinement, there is potential to
connect an individual with a particular location through
their shared microorganisms with animals [47].
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Cell type
The Human Microbiome Project (HMP) [13] and the
assignment of bacteria to primary areas of the human
body prompted the identification of body parts that may
have been in contact with public surfaces in subways
[16]. As each tissue also has unique gene expression
[48], RNA [49], and epigenetic [50] measurements,
different molecules could potentially be used for cross-
validation in the future. This is currently unrealistic
outside of lab conditions, but given the rapidity of
technological advancements and model accuracies, the
potential is considerable.
Obesity
Microbiome profiles of obese and non-obese people can
differ dramatically [51].
This could not only allow the stratification of individ-
ual profiles [52], but also potentially provide insight into
valuable information on digestion or the eating habits of
the individual [53]. Although host genetics are more reli-
able for host identification, there is potential to acquire
some useable information in the absence of sufficient
quality and quantity of DNA from somatic or germ cells.
Pregnancy
The maternal gut microbiome begins similar to that of
non-pregnant women [54] but changes throughout the
pregnancy [55]. While the statistical relationships in
these studies can be weak and multifactorial, they could,
eventually, be used to identify an individual’s gestational
status accurately.
Circadian rhythm
Although this application is presently only speculative,
the coupling of RNA modifications with circadian
rhythm could be developed as epitranscriptomic markers
to determine if someone was sleeping or awake based on
the cells left in their bed [56]. However, areas for advance-
ment would need to include optimizing the processing of
low biomass samples, which face additional challenges of
degradation and environmental contamination.
Disease and infection
The carriage of oral pathogens is not only an indicator
of periodontal health [57], but also an indicator of more
complex disorders like pancreatic cancer [58]. Assuming
RNA is preserved on a surface, modifications to RNA
can contribute towards understanding if a person’s body
is responding to a human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)
infection, as well as the type and severity of the HIV in-
fection [59]. It is unrealistic to assume that information
can currently be used with a high level of accuracy. Still,
it does highlight another potential privacy issue that
could have important implications in the future.
Ubiquitous measurements and potential counter-
measures
Many recent advances in genomics and biomedicine are
made possible by technological advancements in cam-
eras and imaging. These tools have enabled us to peer
inside single cells with unparalleled resolution. The af-
fordability and high resolution of contemporary cameras
have also enabled their adaptations to forensics. A “time
machine” of movement around a city can be created
with the use of drones that maintain a geosynchronous
location above a city through daily image collection. A
private company, Persistent Surveillance, has used
manned aircraft equipped with high-powered cameras to
track and catch criminals in Camden (New Jersey, USA)
and Ciudad Juárez (Mexico) [60]. Location information
can also be gained through cell phone tracking using the
multilateration of radio signals between different cell
towers of the network and the phone or even more eas-
ily using GPS. In 2019, the existence of a file containing
50 billion data points recording the movements of 12
million American cell phone users, including the US
President and his guests, was revealed [61]. In a land-
mark US Supreme Court case, it was determined that
“the time-stamped data provides an intimate window
into a person’s life, revealing not only his particular
movements but through them his ‘familial, political, pro-
fessional, religious and sexual associations’” and is
thereby a violation of the Fourth Amendment to the US
Constitution to gain access to these data without a
search warrant [62]. Personal information, however, con-
tinues to be collected, analyzed, and cross-referenced, as
has been demonstrated when a teenager’s consumer
metadata revealed her pregnancy even before her par-
ents were made aware [63].
The new abilities to collect personal information have
severe implications for people’s expectations of privacy.
DNA evidence, the key to the conviction or exoneration
of suspects of various types of crime, from theft to rape
and murder, can be fabricated and planted in the crime
scene to implicate any known genetic profile [64]. If
travel history is detectable, it can not only be mined for
criminal or other investigations but could potentially be
used in marital disputes, employment discrimination,
and other tracking purposes. Combined with data min-
ing methods employed by corporations, surveillance
tools are increasingly eliminating the traditional notion
of privacy. Indeed, if DNA sequencers were truly ubiqui-
tous, not only could one’s identity be matched with their
location, but their actions and associations may also be
inferred through a “genetic time machine” (Fig. 1) and
cross-referenced with corporate and online information.
Due to these potential encroachments on privacy and
ample molecular means to link deposited cells and mole-
cules to phenotypes, new approaches for obfuscation
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have been developed and even patented [65]. It is
possible to order and spray synthetic oligonucleotides to
mask one’s historical presence in a room [64]. However,
unless such “genetic camouflage” encompasses the
cross-genome spectrum (Fig. 1), the deception could be
detected. Nonetheless, the potential to assemble such a
precise molecular match to a person’s genetic and mo-
lecular identity, which can be obtained from public data-
bases [21], may create new opportunities in forensics
and considerable problems. A technology for accurate
and specific matches at the genetic, epigenetic, RNA,
epitranscriptome, and microbial levels would also
augment the ability to frame a person in a criminal con-
text. Moreover, although this is currently speculative,
with precise methods for trans-differentiation and re-
differentiation of cells, it might be possible to convert
the skin cells left behind at the scene of a crime into
erythrocytes and imply that a bloody incident had
occurred. With easy-to-use CRISPR systems [66] and
epigenetic modification mechanisms [67], such precise
and potentially malicious genetic manipulations can
feasibly be developed.
Given these developments, we call for renewed and
widespread discussions on genetic privacy, the legal im-
plications of these new technologies, and updated statu-
tory protections. We also call for explicit considerations
for microbiome-derived data in any standards and regu-
lations designed to protect genetic privacy.
Conclusions
Just as the amount of traceable electronic data for
people in the modern era only grows with time, the like-
lihood of a person’s biological remnants being found in
the environment also increases with time, concomitant
with an ever-increasing ability to extract and interpret
these data. Many of the tools are theoretical at present,
and molecular methods and interpretation are unlikely
ever to be 100% accurate. Nonetheless, given the num-
ber of tests that can be used across all different data
types, metrics, and kingdoms of life, a new “cross-king-
dom forensic landscape” has emerged that eviscerates
previous notions of privacy. The speed and availability of
these tools, algorithms, and multi-layered mechanisms
for detection and re-programming of identity from gen-
omics and post-genomic data are increasing. This will
likely create challenges for judicial enforcement for those
who violate the law. It also raises critical questions about
who has access to the metadata, genetic material, and
the unintended revelatory information encased in micro-
scopic particles left on every surface.
Given all the identifiable information that is present in
a sample and all the metadata about people that are be-
ing collected, a new risk of discrimination is now an
issue. Unfortunately, legal frameworks, like GINA [6]
and equivalent US state statutes, do not prevent life in-
surance underwriters from changing their premiums
based on genetic markers—even if the markers were
taken from genetic material left on a drinking cup (Fig. 1)
or the saliva under the stamp or envelope that was mailed
to the insurance company [68]. Moreover, any informa-
tion about family members could also legally be used as a
basis for altered eligibility, coverage, or premiums on life,
disability, or long-term care insurance. By extension, any
of the forensics mechanisms described above could poten-
tially be used to change, deny, or alter coverage for a
person or their relatives.
These legal frameworks, designed to safeguard
worker’s DNA and genetic information, are frozen by
the definitions provided by the legislature and thus do
not apply to the epigenome, microbiome, or metagen-
ome information. Specifically, the GINA statute says that
“a genetic test means an analysis of human DNA, RNA,
chromosomes, proteins, or metabolites, that detects ge-
notypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes” [5]. In
other words, all other biologic non-genomic personal
identifying information may be used to achieve what
GINA attempted to prevent: health insurance and em-
ployment discrimination. Consider, for example, the case
of Lowe v. Atlas Logistics Group Retail Services [69],
where the company’s employees were asked to under-
take a genetic Short tandem repeats (STR) test to iden-
tify the mysterious “devious defecator” who violated
their warehouse. Plaintiffs Lowe and Dennis filed a law-
suit under GINA and won; however, had the plaintiffs
been asked to submit a gut microbiome sample, GINA
would not have been protected them. Concerningly,
even the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA) of 2010, which prohibits health insurance com-
panies from using genetic information to establish the
rules or terms of an individual’s eligibility, never defined
“genetic information” [70].
It is noteworthy that the GINA and ACA only set the
minimum bar of protection against genetic discrimin-
ation, and US state laws can set up stricter protections.
For example, in 2011, the California Legislature passed
the California Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act” (CalGINA), yet even this more stringent act [71]
maintained GINA’s definition for genetic information.
Given this loophole, an updated GINA and similar frame-
works should account for these non-human markers and
the battery of molecular signatures described above. Only
more inclusive policies that guard any “personally-identi-
fying molecular signature” to be exempt from use in insur-
ance and employment decisions and options for people, as
well as their relatives, can guarantee against genetic dis-
crimination. An example for such an elaborated definition
can be found in the recently issued California Genetic
Information Privacy Act (“GIPA”) aimed to regulate the
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privacy and security aspects of genetic testing and testing
companies. The act defines “Genetic data” as “any data,
regardless of its format, that results from the analysis of a
biological sample from a consumer, or from another
element enabling equivalent information to be obtained,
and concerns genetic material. Genetic material includes,
but is not limited to, deoxyribonucleic acids (DNA),
ribonucleic acids (RNA), genes, chromosomes, alleles,
genomes, alterations or modifications to DNA or RNA,
single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), uninterpreted
data that results from the analysis of the biological sample,
and any information extrapolated, derived, or inferred
therefrom” [72]. Such updated language can also inform
which of these elements could be controlled, utilized for
the public good, or patented. Although privacy may be
hard to keep in a world of ubiquitous genetic, molecular,
and data profiling, the statutes and laws can be updated as
the methods and tools advance.
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